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Analyzing Price’s Leadership in Missouri
In early September 1864 an army commanded by Sterling Price crossed the
northern border of Arkansas and entered Missouri hoping it could undo the
effects of two years of Federal political and military dominance of the state.
After a fierce engagement at Pilot Knob that compelled a Union force
commanded by Thomas Ewing to abandon Fort Davidson, the Confederates
advanced to within fifty miles of St. Louis before turning west toward Jefferson
City. After failing to overcome Federal defenses at the state capital, Price’s men
continued pushing west until Union forces commanded by the
much-underappreciated Samuel Curtis and oft-maligned Alfred Pleasonton
defeated them in hard-fought battles at Westport and the Little Blue River on
October 23. After suffering another bad defeat a few days later at Mine Creek,
what was left of Price’s badly depleted force limped back to Arkansas leaving
behind a Missouri in which Federal command of the state was even firmer than
before the grand expedition began.
Despite its undeniable importance in the history of the war in the
Trans-Mississippi and the scale and scope of the operation (Westport saw more
troops participate than any other battle west of the great river) Price’s 1864
operations in Missouri have not attracted a great deal of attention from
historians. To be sure, the conflict in Missouri has been the subject of a number
of studies the past few decades; however, these works have tended to focus on
the events of the first year of the war that resulted in the expulsion of
pro-Southern political leaders and military forces from the state and the guerrilla
war that ravaged it throughout the conflict. Until now, those interested in the
1864 campaign have primarily had to rely on Howard N. Monnett’s Action
Before Westport, 1864, which was published in 1964 by the Westport Historical
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Society. While a fine work that provided a solid overview of the overall
campaign, Monnett’s study, reflecting the fact that it was written in part to
support preservation and interpretative efforts around Westport, as a matter of
course focused mainly on the events around modern Kansas City that culminated
in the battles of October 23.
Thus, there has been a compelling, if not pressing, need for a new study of
this campaign, one that not only provides a more thorough account of the entire
campaign than Monnett’s, but also incorporates insights on the military and
political dynamics that shaped the conduct of the Civil War in general and the
war in the Trans-Mississippi in particular contained in modern scholarship on
those subjects. It is a need that Mark A. Lause’s Price’s Lost Campaign: The
1864 Invasion of Missouri admirably, though only partially, fills.
One of Lause’s main objectives is to demonstrate that previous students of
the subject have erred in labeling Price’s expedition a “raid." Rather, he argues
Confederate objectives were much grander than suggested by the term “raid" and
that both sides accepted the use of that term in an attempt to downplay their own
failings in its course. Indeed, another of Lause’s main themes is how poorly just
about every leader tasked with leading and responding to Price’s incursion into
Missouri performed. In the case of Price, Lause is treading a well-worn path, for
it is the rare objective student of the campaign or Price’s career in general who
has found much worthy of admiration in the Confederate leader’s performance in
1864. Yet, Lause also offers the reader a less-than-admiring portrait of William
S. Rosecrans, commander of Union forces in St. Louis, as a man who was
insufficiently impressed by the scale of the Confederate expedition, oddly
ineffective in responding to it, and seemingly much more concerned with
catering to the city’s business interests in their dealings with disgruntled workers
than dealing with the rebels. For those who still believe in hoary myths of a
chivalrous and honorable Confederacy, Lause also provides unflinchingly honest
accounts of the barbarous conduct of Price’s men as they moved through
Missouri. Yet, he also notes, there was a poetic justice in that knowledge of the
thuggery of the Confederates played no small part in the bitter resistance
Ewing’s men put up at Pilot Knob and Unionists demonstrated at Jefferson City.
For all its merits, though, Lause’s account of the campaign is ultimately
incomplete. He ends the narrative at Jefferson City and makes only passing
mention of the marching and fighting that followed west of the state capital.
Moreover, in any work of military history, especially one that gets into the level
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol14/iss1/35
DOI: 10.31390/cwbr.14.1.13

2

Rafuse: Price's Lost Campaign: The 1864 Invasion of Missouri

of operational and tactical detail that this one does, good maps are essential.
Lamentably, only two are provided here and those are inadequate in terms of
detail and scope for those needing visual assistance for their efforts to follow the
narrative.
Still, on the whole, this is an effective study and a worthy addition to the
University of Missouri Press’s distinguished Shades of Blue and Gray series.
Lause provides a level of operational and tactical detail on the 1864 campaign
that is impressive, compelling, and has heretofore been missing from the
literature, while offering analyses of men and events that are sober, balanced,
and persuasive. It will be the rare reader who finishes this book without hoping
that Lause will continue his research and tell the rest of the story of this great
campaign in the lamentably oft-neglected Trans-Mississippi.
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